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NORMING IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner1

How do regulatory agencies decide how strictly to regulate an
industry? They sometimes use cost-benefit analysis or claim to, but
more often the standards they invoke are so vague as to be
meaningless. This raises the question whether the agencies use an
implicit standard or instead regulate in an ad hoc fashion. We argue
that agencies frequently use an approach that we call “norming.”
They survey the practices of firms in a regulated industry and
choose a standard somewhere within the distribution of existing
practices, often no higher than the median. Such a standard burdens
only the firms whose practices lag the industry. We then evaluate
this approach. While a case can be made that norming is appropriate
when a regulatory agency operates in an environment of extreme
uncertainty, we argue that on balance norming is an unwise form of
regulation. Its major attraction for agencies is that it minimizes
political opposition to regulation. Norming does not serve the public
interest as well as a more robust standard like cost-benefit analysis.

INTRODUCTION
A furious debate about how government agencies should regulate
when they are authorized to do so under general statutory mandates has
mostly neglected the question of how agencies do regulate. The two questions
are different, of course. The “should” question has focused in recent years on
the role of cost-benefit analysis, with scholars taking sides pro or con, and
some scholars advocating other standards like feasibility analysis.2 In this
debate, scholars cite agency regulatory impact statements (RIAs) and related
materials, and judicial opinions, but mainly to criticize or defend the
agencies’ explanations for their regulations. They do not usually question the
agencies’ explanations or try to figure out the real springs of agency action.
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A smaller literature looks at what agencies do. Some scholars provide
detailed case studies that report and evaluate the reasoning used by agencies.3
Others have produced studies that evaluate agency regulations in aggregate
to see if they generate benefits or costs, with mixed results.4 A strand of the
literature focuses on political influences on agencies.5 But there is little
attention to how agencies decide whether to regulate, and—of particular
interest to us—how they decide on the level of regulatory strictness once they
have decided to regulate.
In this Article, we suggest that agencies often use a distinctive style
of decision-making, which we call “norming.” A norm is “a set standard of
development or achievement usually derived from the average or median
achievement of a large group.”6 We convert the noun into a verb to capture
what we think agencies are doing. In deciding how strict to make a regulation,
agencies may choose a level of strictness that puts significant burdens on
industry outliers—the firms with the worst practices—while putting limited
burdens or none at all to the firms whose practices are of average quality or
better. We call this practice “norming” because it allows the statistical
norm—reflecting the actual practices of industries—to provide the source of
the regulatory standard. This should have the effect of truncating the
distribution at the low-quality end.
While agencies do not use the word “norming” to describe their
decision-making procedures, we show that they often engage in this behavior.
In some cases, a statute directs an agency to engage in norming. In other
cases, agencies have interpreted statutes to allow or require them to engage
in norming. And in still other cases, agencies seem to engage in norming in
tandem with other approaches, like feasibility analysis or cost-benefit
analysis.
After providing background in Part I, we document several instances
of norming in Part II. Our goal is not to survey agency behavior exhaustively
but to persuade the reader that norming is a sufficiently important agency
3
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practice to deserve scholarly and public attention. In Part III, we evaluate
norming from the standpoint of the public good. Agencies often engage in
norming, but should they? An argument can be made that norming is a
reasonable way to proceed when regulators are highly uncertain about best
practices, but we argue that cost-benefit analysis is the better approach. The
problem with norming is that often even the average or high-quality practices
within an industry cause harm to the public, justifying a regulatory response.
We suggest that the major reason for norming is that it is politically attractive.
Industry opposition to regulation is often intense, but when the burden of
regulation falls on only the worst firms, the industry may not be opposed to
it. The leading firms in the industry may even support the regulation because
the outliers harm the reputation of the industry or pose costly threats to the
dominance of the stronger firms. Finally, in Part IV, we further illustrate the
attraction and limitations of norming by discussing instances in which courts
have engaged in norming. The most familiar example comes from the
jurisprudence of the Eighth Amendment, which requires courts to strike down
punishments that are, in terms of harshness, outliers from the statistical
distribution represented by the states.
I. REGULATORY STANDARDS AND DECISION PROCEDURES
A.

Legal Standards

When Congress creates administrative agencies and gives them
directions, it usually uses broad language that is susceptible to multiple
interpretations. For example, one section of the Clean Air Act, which governs
emissions from power plants, instructs the EPA to issue regulations that are
“appropriate and necessary.”7 The language means not only that the EPA
should issue regulations when appropriate and necessary, but that the
strictness of a regulation should be “appropriate and necessary.” Anytime an
agency regulates, it must choose a level of strictness, and that level could
range from zero or de minimis, to extreme—in this case, for example,
mandating an emission level of zero, which would destroy the power
industry. Congress evidently wanted EPA to avoid both extremes but gave
no guidance as to how strict the regulation should be, within the vast range
between de minimis and maximal.
In other cases, Congress provided more concrete instructions while
still leaving much to the agency’s discretion. For instance, one section of the
Clean Water Act instructs the EPA to mandate the “best technology available
for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”8 This language is less vague
7
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than “appropriate and necessary,” but it still leaves much in doubt. Is the
“best” technology the most effective (i.e., cleanest) technology, or the most
efficient (i.e., cost-effective) technology? For a technology to be “available,”
must it already be in use, or can it be on the drawing board? And so forth.9
Agencies address these ambiguities by offering interpretations or
relying on decision procedures, which are reported in various regulatory
documents. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts accept reasonable
interpretations.10 The courts have sanctioned regulations based on costbenefit analysis as well as regulations based on other types of
methodologies.11 However, the fact that an agency has legal authority under
Chevron to select a particular level of regulation does not mean that the level
of regulation it selected was well-chosen. Agencies have been criticized
frequently both for excessively strict and insufficiently strict regulation.12
These criticisms are often based on cost-benefit analyses, which evaluated
regulations by comparing the burden on industry with the monetized benefits
the regulations sought to achieve. In an effort to remedy this problem, a
succession of presidents (beginning with Reagan and extending through
Obama and Trump) have required most agencies to produce a cost-benefit
analysis each time it promulgates a regulation with an economic impact of
more than $100 million per year.13 This requirement has become
entrenched.14
The fact that agencies are required to perform cost-benefit analysis
when regulating does not mean that they always use cost-benefit analysis to
decide how stringently to regulate. In some cases, statutes appear to bar the
agencies from relying on a cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, even when they
use cost-benefit analysis, often different levels of regulatory strictness may
all be consistent with a cost-benefit standard. Accordingly, agencies have
9

The administrative state is far too vast, and the various regulatory statutes far too
numerous, for us to canvas even a small portion of them here. For a partial catalog of major
regulatory provisions, which highlights the many variations in regulatory language, see
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. Chi.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (hereinafter “Judicial Role”) (Appendix).
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(2016) (documenting cases in which courts have been deferential to agency choice of
methodology); Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost
Analysis, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 575 (2015) (documenting judicial deference to agency costbenefit analysis).
12
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typically relied upon a number of different decision procedures or
methodologies for selecting regulatory standards, which we describe below.15
B.

Decision Procedures

Cost-benefit analysis. Under a cost-benefit analysis, an agency issues
a regulation if the benefits exceed the costs. The costs typically include the
expense of compliance, which may involve installing safety devices, training
workers, and discontinuing production methods—capital and labor expenses
borne by industry, passed on to consumers as higher prices, shareholders as
lower returns, and workers as lower wages or layoffs. The benefits typically
involve improvements in public health, safety, convenience, and other forms
of well-being. The major virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that if (as is often
claimed) the regulator’s goal is to improve public welfare, the decision
procedure enables the agency to identify all aspects of public welfare that the
regulation might affect, and provides a straightforward means for evaluating
it.
The simple formulation masks numerous complexities and problems,
both normative and methodological—the topic of a vast literature.16 We will
not rehearse these problems here, except to note one of them which is relevant
to our current topic. Because of the complexity of the economy and human
behavior, it is often difficult to determine whether an incremental increase in
the stringency of the regulation will produce more net benefits or more net
costs. Agencies that demand a high degree of certainty before regulating may
thus end up regulating too little, while agencies that forge ahead despite
uncertainty are often accused of recklessness. For the same reason, agencies
may find it difficult to defend reasonable but speculative judgments when
their regulations are challenged in court.17
Feasibility analysis. Because some statutes require agencies to
implement regulations where “feasible,” an idea has developed that agencies
should conduct “feasibility analysis,” which means that the agency should
regulate as strictly as possible short of driving firms or industries out of
15

C.R.S. Rep. No. R41561 (2016)
See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 37-40; John C. Coates IV,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 Yale L.
J. 882 (2014); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial
Regulation, 43 J. Legal Stud. 351 (2014)
17
See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 86 (2015) (hereinafter “Unquantified
Benefits”), for a discussion. See also Amy Sinden, The Problem of Unquantified Benefits,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087370 (unpublished manuscript
2017).
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business.18 Agencies that conduct feasibility analysis sometimes try to predict
a regulation’s effect on unemployment within the industry, and they curtail
regulation if the predicted effect seems excessive; at other times, they try to
predict how many firms will be driven into bankruptcy, and again curtail
regulation if the number seems too large.
Feasibility analysis is, in principle, a simpler and more manageable
procedure than cost-benefit analysis because the regulator does not need to
evaluate all the effects of a regulation, only some of them. But this is also the
chief objection to feasibility analysis. Because consumers and investors incur
costs from regulation, and their well-being is part of the public good, their
losses should be taken into account by the agency.19 Other problems with
feasibility analysis includes its focus on business failure (which is not
necessarily bad), and the ambiguity of the regulatory standard.
Narrow tradeoffs (for example, risk-risk). In some cases, agencies
focus on a few of the most important and salient effects of regulations while
ignoring others.20 Consider, for example, a regulation that approves a
pharmaceutical. The drug might reduce the risk of one bad outcome
(including death) but also create risks of others. In risk-risk analysis, the
agency evaluates a regulation according to its impact on a narrow range of
severe risks (death or serious injury or illness) while ignoring other effects
on well-being, which may be difficult to quantify.
Like feasibility analysis, risks-risk analysis neglects many of the
welfare effects of regulation. Risk is not the only thing that matters; so does,
for example, the price tag on an automobile.
Quality-adjusted life years and cost-effectiveness analysis. In
healthcare regulation, an ambitious effort has been made to evaluate medical
procedures according to how much they extend life adjusted by quality.21 The
approach reflects the intuition that a medical procedure that extends life by
10 years but also does not alleviate suffering might be worse than an
alternative medical procedure that extends life by 8 years but does alleviate
18

See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Cost of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005).
19
Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 10, at 682-84. But see David
M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 318-20
(2011).
20
Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS
RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226, 228-29 (John D.
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
21
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suffering. The QALY approach is meant to reflect that individuals often
prefer the second procedure to the first. Since cost remains a consideration—
hospitals cannot spend an infinite amount of money on medical procedures—
but is not directly included in the analysis, this type of procedure is a type of
cost-effectiveness analysis. On this approach, the question is, given a budget,
how is that budget best spent to advance well-being. A virtue of this approach
is it avoids the problems of monetization. The defect is that a budget must be
determined, and it is hard to see how the agency (or Congress) can determine
the budget in the first place without performing cost-benefit analysis or
another form of welfare analysis.
Break-even analysis. Sometimes an agency is able to estimate the
costs of a regulation but not the benefits (or, on rare occasions, the benefits
but not the costs). This might be because the benefits are hard to price, but it
is more commonly used when the benefits themselves are simply uncertain,
such as when the agency is unsure how many premature deaths the regulation
is likely to prevent.22 In such a case, an agency employing break-even
analysis would calculate the “break-even point”: the quantity of benefits that
the regulation must produce in order for costs to equal benefits.23 Thus, for
instance, imagine that a regulation is expected to cost $100 million, and the
agency values each life saved at $10 million. The break-even point for this
regulation is ten lives.
The problem with break-even analysis is that it does not actually tell
the agency whether or not to regulate (much less how stringently to
regulate).24 In the example above, what good does it do the agency to know
that the break-even point is ten lives if (by hypothesis) the agency does not
know how many lives the regulation will save? In order to actually make
decisions, the agency must formulate some estimate of the likely benefits or
have some intuitive sense of whether benefits will exceed costs. Break-even
analysis thus often reduces to a kind of incomplete cost-benefit analysis.
Intuitive (or ad hoc) balancing. This approach involves a broad and
comprehensive look at all the possible effects of regulation, akin to costbenefit analysis, but without monetization of the benefits (and sometimes the
costs as well). In these cases, the agency often insists that the benefits cannot
be reliably monetized because of the uncertainty of the effects of the
22

Regulation does not actually “save lives,” in the sense that everyone will die
eventually. Accordingly, some experts speak of regulation as “prolonging life” or
“preventing premature death.” We use these various terms interchangeably here.
23
Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for Regulatory Breakeven
Analysis, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1469, 1487-89 (2014).
24
Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 17, at 93.
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regulation or the nature of the benefits, which can be intangible and abstract,
such as the pleasure that people derive from knowing that wilderness is
preserved even if they do not visit it.25 When the agency regulates, it does so
on the ground that the benefits justify the costs even though a formal costbenefit analysis cannot be performed.
Intuitive balancing is ubiquitous in daily life as well as in government.
When employers offer amenities to employees, they often rely on a rough
intuitive sense and do not bother trying to do a cost-benefit analysis, which
may be unreliable. When governments build monuments, parks, and other
public amenities, they will typically calculate the costs but often rely on a
rough sense of the public interest in these amenities rather than try to
monetize the benefits. Thus, intuitive balancing should not be dismissed out
of hand. But its major defect is that because benefits and costs are not fully
monetized, they decisionmaker may make an error or be subject to some type
of bias. It is also difficult for outsiders, including researchers and auditors, to
evaluate the project.
Democratic procedures. Finally, agencies always solicit the views of
regulated entities, as they are required by law, but sometimes they go farther
and try to arrange agreements, votes, and other forms of participation among
those directly affected by a regulatory program. Within constraints, and
subject to the agency’s supervision, a form of democracy prevails, in the
sense that the ultimate regulation or project emerges from debate and
presumably reflects the self-interested calculations of the affected parties.26
Under the democratic approach, the agency avoids the burden of evaluating
potential regulations based on a notion of the public good, but takes the risk
that the democratic procedure it chooses ends up excluding some affected
people or giving improper weight to sophisticated parties who figure out how
to game the system.
There are not always distinct lines between these approaches: overall,
agencies frequently adopt a kind of pluralistic approach, defending their
regulations by claiming that they are consistent with multiple decision
procedures. Agencies often estimate valuations and report them without
performing a complete cost-benefit analysis, or estimate some valuations
while ignoring others.27 Regulatory impact analyses often include a range of
overlapping approaches. In many of them, agencies seem to engage in
intuitive balancing and cost-benefit analysis, and also to take account
25

Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis, VA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)..
26
For some examples, see Karen Bradshaw, Democratic Risk Management
(unpublished manuscript 2017).
27
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concerns about feasibility and unemployment.28 And, as we will demonstrate,
actual agency practice often involves a kind of norming, even if the agency
is nominally using one of these other decision procedures.
II. NORMING IN PRACTICE
A.

What Is Norming?

Norming is yet another approach to regulation. It can take different
forms, and so to ground intuitions, we start with a simple example.
Imagine that the EPA must regulate a particular practice in a
particular industry, for example, ozone emissions from power plants. Upon
investigation, it learns that the various power plants emit different amounts
of ozone. There could be various reasons for this variation. For example,
some plants might have been constructed more recently with the best new
technology, which results in less ozone emission just because of the
efficiency of that technology. Alternatively, some plants might have better
technology because they are operated more cautiously by managers who
worry about legal and reputational consequences, or because they are located
in states or other jurisdictions where local legal standards for pollution are
stricter. Or plants might not emit much ozone because of the particularities
of their location, which might allow them to use inputs or adopt production
processes that generate less ozone than other plants do. We can imagine many
other reasons; we explore some of them below. For now, the basic point is
that there will be natural variation in ozone emissions across plants.
The exact shape of that distribution will also depend on the
circumstances, but our argument does not depend on that shape having any
specific form. The major point is that all (realistic) distributions have tails.
At the right tail, firms emit more ozone than other firms; at the left tail, they
emit less. In the middle of the distribution, the firms cluster around average
levels of emissions. We also bracket, within limits, the nature of the variable
in question. The EPA may be concerned about the overall level of emission
per plant; or the level of emission relative to something else, like units of
production; or the costs that the firms have incurred in reducing emissions.
The variable will be normatively relevant to whatever EPA’s statutory
mandate is—presumably, to advance the well-being of people who are
exposed to the pollution, or of people generally (including consumers and
workers).
To understand what norming is, let’s start with how the EPA would
approach the problem of setting a level of regulatory strictness using cost28

Id. at 117-18.
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benefit analysis. In principle, the EPA could require firms to reduce ozone
emissions to zero (equivalently: to install expensive technology or shut down
production), or the EPA could impose a de minimis regulation (requiring the
plants to do nothing at all), or anything in between. A cost-benefit analysis
tells the EPA to set the level that maximizes benefits (usually in terms of
human health, including reduced mortality risk, lower medical expenses, and
so on) net of costs (the costs to the firms). The best regulation based on a
cost-benefit analysis could turn out to require all firms, most firms, or a few
firms, or no firms, to reduce emissions. Everything depends on what the
underlying variables are.
In the case of norming, the EPA derives from the distribution itself
the proper level of regulation. We define norming to mean that the EPA sets
the level of regulatory strictness somewhere between the best firm and zero.
Every firm that exceeds the standard may continue to conduct business as
usual. Every firm that falls below the standard must bring its production into
compliance with the standard.
Figure 1: Norming

Figure 1 illustrates the simple point we are trying to make. Imagine
that the horizontal axis represents a variable of interest to the regulator—such
as the amount of pollution that a factory emits, increasing from left to right.
The vertical axis represents the number of factories at any given level of
pollution. While Figure 1 shows a normal curve, the distribution could have
any shape. The vertical line shows the “norm” chosen by the regulator. The
factories that fall to the right of the vertical line are out of regulatory
compliance. If the regulation is enforced, those factories will be either shut
down or brought into compliance. As a result, the right tail of the postregulation distribution will be truncated.
While the regulation at Figure 1 sets the standard at the median
factory, an agency that engages in norming, as we define it, could set the
standard at any location along the distribution. A weak standard would be
located at the right side of the distribution; nearly all firms would be in
compliance. A strict standard would be located at the left side of the
distribution; nearly all firms would be out of compliance. The distinctive
feature of norming is that the regulatory standard is internal to existing
practices of the industry—it is based on the distribution of existing firm
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practices—rather than derived from exogenous factors like cost, benefit, and
risk.
Another question raised by norming is the nature of the variable of
interest to the regulator. In our example, we suggested that an agency might
be concerned about the amount of pollution emitted per factory. However, an
agency might care more about the amount of pollution per unit of production,
or per unit of social benefit, or the social harm per unit of production, or some
other measure. As we will see below, agencies norm on the basis of a range
of different variables.
In some cases, agencies explicitly acknowledge that they are engaging
in norming, and sometimes the governing statutes even require it. This is
particularly true in the context of environmental law. In other cases, another
type of decision procedure (such as feasibility analysis) reduces to norming
as it is practiced by agencies. Finally, in a third category of cases, agencies
engage in norming as a shortcut, anticipating that it will lead to good (though
not ideal) regulation.
In the sections that follow, we survey some of the most important
regulatory agencies, spanning a wide variety of areas of law. We demonstrate
the ways in which those agencies rely upon norming in their regulatory
decision-making.
B.

Environmental Law

The EPA relies substantially upon norming. In some cases, a statute
explicitly directs the agency to engage in norming; in other cases, the agency
has interpreted its governing statutes to require norming, even when other
options might be available. Here, we focus upon two EPA case studies, one
based upon the Clean Water Act, and one based upon the Clean Air Act. We
then briefly survey other sections of the environmental laws and describe the
ways in which they require the EPA to engage in norming as well.
1.

Clean Water Act.

The Clean Water Act requires the EPA to regulate the discharge of
conventional pollutants from existing point sources by mandating the “best
practicable control technology currently available.”29 The statute further
directs the EPA to determine the best practicable control technology by
considering:

29

33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A).

11

the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent
reduction benefits to be achieved from such application, … the age of
equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the
engineering aspects of the application of various types of control
techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact
. . . and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate . .
. .30
In applying this language, the EPA has employed a regulatory methodology
that it terms “average of the best.” The EPA identifies the best-performing
polluters within the category of polluters being regulated, where the “bestperforming” polluters are those who emit the least pollution, and requires all
the polluters to perform as well as the average of the best-performing
polluters—hence, “average of the best.” The “average of the best” standard
appears to have originated in congressional debates over the Clean Water Act
in 1972.31 The standard was initially proposed by Senator Edmund Muskie,
the sponsor and principal drafter of the Clean Water Act, during Senate floor
debates over the Clean Water Act.32
One example of this methodology comes from the EPA’s 1987
regulation of producers of organic compounds, plastics, and synthetic
fibers.33 Manufacturers of these products emit a wide variety of hazardous
pollutants.34 In the course of its regulation, the EPA first identified 304
sources of pollution (factories) that would be subject to regulation.35 It then
selected the 99 sources (of these 304) that were employing the “best”
technology to control emissions.36 (The agency concluded that the best
technology was “biologic treatment,” followed by “secondary clarification as
necessary to assure adequate treatment of solids.”)37 Of these 99 sources, the
EPA then selected the 71 plants that had achieved the greatest pollution
30

33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
Thomas B. Arnold, Effluent Limitations and NPDES: Federal and State
Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 15 B.C. L.
REV. 767, 767-83 (1974).
32
118 Cong. Rec. 33696 (1972) (“The Administrator should establish the range of "best
practicable" levels based upon the average of the best existing performance by plants of
various sizes, ages, and unit processes within each industrial category.”).
33
EPA, Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 52
Fed. Reg. 42,522 (1987).
34
Id. at 42,526-27.
35
Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 208-09 (5th Cir. 1989).
36
Id. at 208; EPA, Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Guidelines,
supra note 30 at 42, 534-35.
37
EPA, Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Guidelines, supra note 30
at 42, 534.
31
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reduction—the plants whose emissions were no more than 40 mg of pollutant
material per liter of water discharged into the public waterways.38 The EPA
set the regulatory standard equal to the average level of pollution control of
these 71 plants.39
At first glance, it might appear as though the EPA has normed to a
fairly stringent degree. In setting the regulatory standard equal to the average
of the best 71 plants, the agency pegged its regulation to (approximately) the
36th-best-performing source, out of 304 sources subject to the regulation.
This is roughly the 88th percentile of all existing sources. However, the
agency makes clear that the regulation would not be nearly so onerous as that
description might sound. According to the agency, the appropriate
technology was already “in place at 156 of 304 direct discharging plants” to
be regulated.40 Accordingly, of the 304 regulated emitters of pollution,
roughly 36 would already be in compliance with the regulation, and another
120 have the necessary pollution control equipment in place and need only to
operate it properly. Only 148 of 304 plants (49%) were required to construct
or install new equipment, at a total cost of $215.8 million.41 Thus, the norm
was set close to the median, as in Figure 1.
This regulation dealt with “conventional” pollutants, which are
governed under the Clean Water Act by the “best practicable technology”
standard. Other sections of the Clean Water Act variously direct the EPA to
mandate the “best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact,”42 the “best conventional pollutant control
technology,”43 the “best available technology economically achievable,”44
and the “best available demonstrated control technology.”45 Each of these
standards involves some type of norming, typically selected by the EPA with
regard to the legislative history of the Clean Water Act. For instance, the “best
available technology economically achievable” applies to the EPA’s
regulation of “toxic” pollutants, such as cyanide, which are especially
harmful to human health and can be fatal in small doses.46 Here, too, the
language is ambiguous and could permit the application of a variety of
potential standards. And here, too, the EPA has adopted a particular rule
based upon its reading of the legislative history. When regulating under the
38
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“best available technology” standard, the EPA pegs its regulation to the single
best-performing plant—the source with the lowest level of pollution
emitted.47
This is, of course, the most stringent possible version of norming—
norming to the furthest outlier. However, while this is the most stringent
statutory standard contained within the Clean Water Act,48 even this standard
directs the agency to regulate based upon technology that already exists and
is in use within the industry. The agency does not mandate the development
or installation of new technology that no firm yet employs.
2.

Clean Air Act

Unlike the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act includes a statutory
standard that explicitly demands norming. Section 112 of the Clean Air Act
authorizes the EPA to regulate sources of “hazardous” pollutants, which are
particularly dangerous airborne chemicals that Congress and the agency have
selected and listed.49 The statute requires that the EPA regulate so as to
produce “the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air
pollutants.”50 The statute then defines “maximum degree of reduction”
differently for new pollution sources—those that are constructed after
regulation is already in place—and existing sources, those that predate
regulation. For new sources, the statute provides that the EPA must prescribe
emissions standards that are at least as stringent as “the emission control that
is achieved in practice by the best controlled similar source.”51 This is
equivalent to the Clean Water Act’s “best available control technology”
standard, though here it is written into the statute rather than having been
created by the agency. For existing sources of pollution, the statute directs
the EPA to promulgate standards that are at least as stringent as “the average
emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the existing
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sources.”52 This is the Clean Air Act’s version of “average of the best,” here
again written directly into the statute.53
Notably, the statute does not require that the agency regulate only to
the standard set by the average of the best-performing twelve percent. This is
only a floor; the agency may regulate more stringently if it wishes.54 In
practice, however, the EPA regularly sets its regulatory standards equal to the
average of the best twelve percent. For instance, in 2004 the EPA issued a
regulation limiting hazardous air pollutant emissions from boilers and
process heaters.55 These types of heaters emit a range of hazardous chemicals,
including arsenic and chromium.56 First, EPA divided the boilers into 18
categories and classified the hazardous air pollutants into four types, for a
total of 18 × 4 = 72 boiler-pollutant subcategories to be regulated.57 In
accordance with the statute, the EPA then determined the “average of the
best” polluters for these seventy-two subcategories. For 25 of them, the
agency set emissions standards.58 For the other 47, the agency refused to
impose any sort of emissions limitation whatsoever, because “the bestperforming sources were not achieving emissions reductions through the use
of an emission control system.”59 That is, even the “best-performing” sources
were doing nothing to reduce their emissions.60
The EPA then announced that it would not impose more stringent
regulation than that dictated by the “average of the best.” The agency
explained:
As documented in the memorandum “Methodology for Estimating
Costs and Emissions Impacts for Industrial, Commercial, and
Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters National Emission
52
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Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants” in the docket, EPA did
consider the cost and emission impacts of a variety of regulatory
options more stringent than the MACT floor for each subcategory.
The EPA recognizes that for some subcategories, more stringent
controls than the MACT floor can be applied and achieve additional
emissions reductions. However, EPA also determined that the cost
impacts of such controls were very high. Considering both the costs
and emissions reductions, EPA determined that it would be infeasible
to require any options more stringent than the floor level.61
The document referenced in the EPA’s explanation does indeed include cost
estimates for two more stringent regulatory options.62 However, it does not
include any comparison between the costs of these regulatory options and the
benefits they would be expected to produce.63 For that, one must turn to the
EPA’s own Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA). The RIA includes
calculations of the costs and benefits of the regulation the EPA eventually
chose, plus one of the more stringent alternatives described in the
“Methodology” document.64 Under both the rule the agency selected and the
one alternative it analyzed, the net benefits of the regulation are significant—
on the order of $15 billion, depending on the discount rate chosen.65 At the
same time, the EPA concluded that the more stringent regulation would
produce slightly lower net benefits than the laxer regulation it selected.66
It is thus possible that the EPA was justified in regulating only to the
level of the “average of the best,” which meant leaving 45 heater/pollutant
subcategories unregulated. However, the agency did not analyze the other
more stringent regulatory option described in the “Methodology” document,
much less a comprehensive set of alternatives.67 By confining itself to an
examination of existing practices, rather than engaging in a full-fledged costbenefit analysis, the agency committed itself to norming.
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Many other parts of the Clean Air Act similarly speak in the language
of norming, even though they do not require it so explicitly as Section 112.
Above, we cited a section of the Clean Air Act that calls for the agency to
regulate to the extent “appropriate and necessary.” As we noted, this
ambiguous language does not offer the agency much guidance and does not
appear to contemplate norming. But other parts of the law are clearer. One
section instructs the EPA to mandate the “best system of emission reduction
. . . adequately demonstrated,”68 another requires the “best available control
technology”69 (much like the Clean Water Act), and a third mandates
“reasonably available control technology.”70
All of these statutory formulations within the Clean Water Act and
Clean Air Act direct the EPA to norm. They instruct the EPA to select a level
of regulation based upon “available” or “achievable” technology, presumably
already in use by some regulated parties, and mandate that technology across
the board. While different statutory sections of the Clean Water Act and
Clean Air Act call for regulation at varying levels of stringency, they simply
represent different levels of norming. For instance, the EPA norms differently
when regulates under the “best available technology” standard in the Clean
Water Act and when it regulates under the “best practicable technology”
standard.71 While the location of the “norm” may be different, the underlying
norming methodology is the same.
B.

Workplace Safety

The Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizes the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to promulgate regulations
regarding workplace safety. OSHA must impose the regulation “which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity.”72 This statutory language gave rise to so-called
“feasibility analysis,” which we criticized in an earlier article.73 Under
feasibility analysis, the agency imposes the strictest possible regulation that
will not lead to mass layoffs or bankrupt significant numbers of firms within
the regulated industry.74
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Feasibility analysis involves a kind of norming. In broad strokes, the
feasibility approach directs OSHA to avoid imposing substantial regulatory
costs on an industry. One obvious means of accomplishing this is to set
regulatory standards that many firms within the industry already meet, thus
imposing no additional costs on those firms. Indeed, this is precisely how
OSHA often regulates. We offer two examples.
The first comes from a major OSHA rule on workplace air
contaminants.75 In this regulation, OSHA identified hundreds of hazardous
chemicals to which employees are exposed in the workplace. In preparation
for the regulation, OSHA surveyed over 1.1 million workplaces.76 It found
that over 500,000 workplaces used one of the chemicals being regulated. But
of those 500,000 workplaces, only 131,005 (or roughly 26%) “would incur
some costs to comply with the new limits.”77 That is, nearly 75% of all
workplaces that used one of the chemicals at issue were already in
compliance with the regulation.
OSHA’s relatively weak regulations were the result of a deliberate
choice. In setting these standards, OSHA did not engage in “true” feasibility
analysis, in the sense of determining how stringently it could regulate without
causing mass layoffs or significant bankruptcies. Instead, it relied on
standards that had been proposed by the American Conference of
Governmental and Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).78 ACGIH standards are
well known in the field for being relatively lax, in part because the ACGIH
largely relies upon industry surveys and data when setting them.79 In fact,
75
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there was evidence that the ACGIH was itself engaged in norming, and that
it had arrived at these standards precisely because they were already in
widespread use throughout the industry. As the chairman of the ACGIH
committee charged with devising the standards explained, the standards
“have been based on a decade or two of industrial experience . . . . Clearly,
such procedures can yield indisputable data on which realistic [standards] can
be derived . . . .”80 Another former chairman of the same committee even
alleged directly that the committee had been overly influenced by the
regulated industry and charged industry consultants with engaging in
“chicanery.”81 In the words of one pair of commentators, “Our conclusion is
that [the ACGIH standards] for chemical substances are a compromise
between health-based considerations and strictly practical industrial
considerations, with the balance seeming to strongly favor the latter.”82 It is
little wonder that so few firms were required to expend resources to comply
with the new OSHA standards.
OSHA never explicitly states that it was engaged in norming. It is
possible that it was unaware of the ACGIH’s reliance on norming, that it
arrived at these standards after some other type of analysis, and that the
resemblance to norming is mere coincidence. Yet it seems reasonable to infer
that the agency chose this standard precisely because it had already been so
widely adopted. OSHA was surely aware that the ACGIH standards had
already been widely adopted, and it must have known of ACGIH’s reputation
for adopting standards congenial to industry. The standard is also lax—too
lax, according to most experts.83 The only thing to recommend the ACGIH
standards is the fact that they had already been widely adopted. It looks very
much as if OSHA was just norming to the 25th percentile.
Our second example is a 1991 OSHA rule regulating risks related to
bloodborne pathogens such as hepatitis B and HIV.84 The purpose of the
regulation was to mandate consistent and reliable safety practices for
workplaces, such as dentists’ or doctors’ offices, where workers might come
into contact with blood.85 OSHA, however, did not create the safety standards
out of whole cloth. Rather, the regulations mirrored a set of guidelines that
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) had released years earlier.86 By the
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time OSHA got around to promulgating the regulation, most businesses had
already implemented their own safety rules based upon the CDC’s regulation
and were already in compliance with the rule or close to it. Here is how
OSHA described the status quo ante:
Since the requirements of the standard closely follow the guidelines
issued by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) on universal
precautions (UP), efforts by many organizations to adhere to the
guidelines have created a solid base of practices and technology for
the supplemental implementation of the standard. Based on recent
surveys conducted by the Agency and other information available in
the rulemaking docket, OSHA produced quantitative estimates of the
compliance baseline, or extent of current compliance. OSHA found
that most establishments have already implemented measures to
protect workers from occupational exposure to blood and other
potentially infectious materials, and that many are very close to full
compliance with this standard.87
Sure enough, after surveying the regulated population, OSHA found that preregulatory rates of compliance ranged as high as 85 to 90 percent for certain
industries and certain requirements.88
It may seem odd or indefensible to criticize an agency for adopting
CDC guidelines in its regulation. After all, the CDC is presumably expert in
this area, and it may well have selected the optimal level of precautions when
formulating its guidelines. However, here that turned out not to be the case.
OSHA’s regulations proved to be inadequate, particularly with respect to
injuries from handling dirty needles. In response, nine years later Congress
passed a new law, the Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act, mandating a
new round of bloodborne pathogen regulation.89 OSHA promulgated new
guidelines, and those remain in effect today.90
As with OSHA’s air contaminant regulation, the agency never states
directly that it is engaged in norming.91 But we can infer that OSHA likely
adopted these standards because they were already in such widespread use.
OSHA’s industry survey predated its regulatory decision. When it
promulgated the regulation, it was aware that a high percentage of firms were
87
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already in compliance. It is also unlikely that OSHA arrived at these
standards through any other type of decision procedure. The standards are
substantially weaker than what either cost-benefit analysis or feasibility
analysis would have dictated.92 Indeed, they were viewed as so insufficient
that Congress passed new legislation to mandate stricter standards less than
a decade later. Accordingly, even without any explicit indication, it is likely
that OSHA’s bloodborne pathogen regulations were the result of norming.
C.

Financial Regulation

Banks are heavily regulated because they impose risks on the
economy. The harmful externality arises from two sources. First, because
banks play a central role in the financial system, and because banks are linked
together through financial transactions, the collapse of one bank can cause
the collapse of the entire financial system, resulting in a sudden withdrawal
of credit from the economy. Because businesses depend on credit, bank
collapse can in turn cause business collapse. Second, because the government
supplies insurance to the banking system—to minimize the risk of a financial
crisis—banks externalize some of the risks they take on the government and
hence the taxpayer. To deter excessive risky financial activities, the
government regulates banks.93
Much of the risk caused by the banking system comes from banks’
reliance on demand deposits for the bulk of their capital needs. As a result,
banks are highly leveraged. High leverage leads to high returns for
shareholders, but also high risk, which is externalized on taxpayers. To
counter this risk, regulators impose capital requirements. These regulations
require banks to raise a certain portion of their capital from equity. The capital
requirement designates that portion—which has varied from about 5 to 8%
over the years. For example (and simplifying greatly), if a bank owns assets
worth $100, and the capital requirement is 5%, then it can be funded with no
more than $95 of debt. The other $5 must take the form of equity.
Banks, like other businesses, do not necessarily maximize their profits
by relying as much as possible on debt. There are business reasons—related
to tax, corporate governance, and other considerations—that cause business
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to choose varying mixes of debt and equity. Many banks maintain relatively
high capital ratios. However, the risk externality and government insurance
cause banks at the margin to substitute debt for equity.
Congress has required regulators to set capital requirements, but
provided little guidance.94 Regulators thus have had considerable discretion
in choosing the stringency of capital requirements. In earlier work, one of us
shows that rather than determine capital requirements using cost-benefit
analysis, regulators have engaged in norming.95 They have chosen capital
requirements that were typically below the capital ratios that prevailed in the
vast majority of banks. The effect was to burden only the least capitalized
banks, the outliers on the distribution of capital ratios. Notably, the financial
agencies justified the capital requirements they chose based on just this
point—that the requirements would burden only a small number of banks.
One of many examples comes from the mid-1980s. In 1983, Congress
passed the International Lending Supervision Act, which required the bank
regulators to “achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing
minimum levels of capital” for the banking system.96 The language provides
no guidance whatsoever but because the statute was passed in response to an
earlier banking crisis, the agencies understood that they were supposed to
raise capital levels. In 1985 the bank regulators raised capital requirements to
5.5% for primary capital and 6% for total capital.
None of the three major regulators explained why they set capital
requirements at these new levels. What they did say was that that the new
levels would affect relatively few banks. The Comptroller of the Currency,
which regulates national banks, said:
[A]pproximately 95% of all national banks had a primary capital ratio
in excess of 6%, a level which would exceed the primary capital
requirement established by this regulation. In addition, most of the
larger multinational and regional banks (which generally have lower
capital ratios than smaller banks) had primary and total capital ratios
which would exceed the minimum requirements.97
In other words, the regulation would affect only a small percentage of
banks—5% of them. This is a classic example of norming.
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There is good reason to believe that the regulations were far from
adequate. Most economists believe that capital requirements should be much
higher.98 Decades later, after the financial crisis, regulators finally jacked up
capital regulations to a respectable level. Norming may have been tempting
in earlier years because it allowed bank regulators to impose restrictions on
the worse banks without stirring resistance from the entire industry. But with
the benefit of hindsight, we can see that this approach was a serious mistake.
D.

Automobile Safety

The regulation of automobile safety by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) has been, from its inception, an exercise in norming.
In 1966, Congress passed the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which delegated
authority to the DOT to promulgate safety regulations.99 The law directed the
Secretary of Transportation to “establish by order appropriate Federal motor
vehicle safety standards. Each such Federal motor vehicle safety standard
shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be
stated in objective terms.”100 The law then specified that the DOT should
immediately engage in at least two rounds of regulation. For the first round
of regulation, the law required the DOT to “issue initial Federal motor vehicle
safety standards based upon existing safety standards.”101 That is, Congress
explicitly instructed the agency to set its initial regulatory standards
according to what firms in the industry were already doing. For the second
round, the law merely directed the agency to issue “new and revised” safety
standards.102 The Motor Vehicle Safety Act thus resembles Section 112 of
the Clean Air Act, in that norming is explicitly written into the language of
the statute.
In 1970, the National Commission on Product Safety commissioned
an outside report by a group of lawyers and law professors to evaluate the
DOT’s progress in regulating auto safety.103 The report examined the
agency’s first 34 regulations and found that 29 of the 34 were either “not
significant” or had “minor significance” in altering the ways in which
automobiles were designed and built.104 The report concluded:
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[T]he best that may be said for the safety standards issued thus far is
that they incorporate some of the best of current practice in the
automobile industry. Almost every performance requirement was
derived from industry development and practice. Industry has led and
Government has followed. The agency has chosen from among
industry’s best practices those suitable for issuance as performance
requirements. If this pattern continues, progress in the issuance of
safety standards could move no faster than industry’s progress in
developing and putting into practice particular safety advances.105
This remained the case even after the agency was no longer required to
promulgate regulations “based upon existing safety standards.”106 As one
study put it, “As a practical matter, however, the ‘existing standards’
requirement of the statute far outlived the initial rules. The point is well
illustrated by the second generation of safety standards . . . . These thirteen
rules were no more innovative than the first generation had been.”107
Decades later, the DOT—and its subunit, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)—now regulate under new authority
from new statutes that do not require norming so explicitly. Nonetheless, the
agency still regularly engages in regulatory norming, though not to the same
degree as in the late 1960s. Consider, for example, a 2011 NHTSA rule meant
to protect automobile occupants from being thrown from their cars during
accidents.108 In 2005, Congress passed a law aimed at preventing deaths from
accidents in which automobiles flipped or rolled over, sometimes referred to
as “rollover crashes.”109 That law directed the DOT to “initiate rulemaking
proceedings, for the purpose of establishing rules or standards that will reduce
vehicle rollover crashes and mitigate deaths and injuries associated with such
crashes,”110 and (like the Motor Vehicle Safety Act) required that those
standards be “practicable.”111
Rollover accidents can become particularly deadly if automobile
passengers and drivers who are not wearing seatbelts are thrown from the
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vehicle through a window. NHTSA thus set out to promulgate regulations
that would keep automobile occupants inside of their vehicles even if they
did not wear seatbelts. There were two potential technologies: side curtain
airbags, which would deploy in the event of a crash and hold occupants inside
the automobile; and advanced lamination techniques for automobile glass
(“advanced glazing,” in industry parlance) that would prevent window glass
from shattering on impact.112 These two technologies are complementary,
and the agency could have mandated both.113 Nonetheless, it opted to require
only the former—the installation of side curtain airbags.114
Although the agency does not admit as much, norming appears to be
a significant part of the reason that it elected to require only airbags and not
advanced glazing as well. By the agency’s calculation, 55% of Model Year
2011 automobiles were already equipped with side curtain airbags that would
trigger in the event of a rollover accident.115 Even some much older
automobiles met the regulatory standards, including the 2004 Honda
Accord116 and the 2003 Toyota Camry.117 Model Year 2011 automobiles
typically arrive on the market in Fall 2010, and the regulation was not set to
take effect until September 2014, around the time that Model Year 2015
automobiles would be released.118 Accordingly, it is likely that by September
2014, many more than 55% of automobiles would have included the
appropriate type of airbag.119 By contrast, advanced glazing was far less
common within the industry.
The comments that the DOT received are instructive. Automobile
manufacturers and their trade groups—including the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers, the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers,
and firms such as Ford and General Motors—were “generally supportive of
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many aspects” of the new rule.120 The manufacturers complained that the
regulations were somewhat too stringent, which is to be expected; if the
regulation had been weaker, even more than 55% of existing automobiles
would already have been in compliance.121 But they generally favored the
agency’s decision to require only airbags and not advanced glazing as well.
Some comments were explicit on this point: “Ford commented that side
glazing retention in real-world rollover crashes is random and unpredictable
and expressed the belief that FMVSS No. 226 should be focused on rolloveractivated side curtain technology.”122
The regulation easily passed a cost-benefit analysis: the DOT
projected approximately $2.3 billion in benefits (based upon preventing 373
fatalities and 476 serious injuries per year) against only $507 million in
costs.123 This is not surprising. Norming will often lead to regulations that
pass cost-benefit tests, precisely because lagging firms are only being asked
to install technology that leading firms have already validated. The question
is whether the DOT could have generated even greater net benefits by
requiring advanced glazing in addition to side curtain airbags. Here, the
evidence is less certain; the agency did not offer a precise estimate of the
costs and benefits of advanced glazing.124 But the agency’s imprecise
calculations suggest that mandating advanced glazing in addition to curtain
airbags plausibly could have increased the regulation’s net benefits.125
In sum, the DOT selected a regulatory standard that was weaker than
CBA would recommend and had already been adopted by more than half of
the industry (and was therefore supported by the industry). This suggests that
the agency was engaged in norming, and that reliance on norming, as opposed
to some other type of decision procedure, may have led the agency to
promulgate a suboptimal regulation.
III. NORMING: COSTS AND BENEFITS
A.

The Case for Norming
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While we are skeptical that norming is a proper method for agency
regulation, we begin by sketching out a possible defense of it. To fix
intuitions, imagine an industry that consists of a large number of firms. The
firms sell to consumers who are mostly different from residents who live
nearby their production facilities; only the residents are harmed when the
firms pollute. Assume that the firms are identical in all respects except two.
First, every firm emits a different amount of pollution into the atmosphere in
the course of manufacturing consumer goods. We can imagine the firms
arrayed along a horizontal line, from the least-polluting firms to the mostpolluting firms, with most of the firms clustered in the middle around the
mean level of emissions. Assume that the firms differ with respect to the
quality, sophistication, and hence expense of the pollution-control
technology they use; the firms that have invested more in that technology
emit less pollution. Second, every firm charges a price for its products that is
inversely related to the amount of pollution that it emits. The most-polluting
firm charges the lowest price; the lease-polluting firm charges the highest
price; and so on. Accordingly, we assume that the cost savings that a firm
enjoys when it avoids reducing emissions are passed on to the consumer in
the form of lower prices.
Before we analyze regulatory approaches, we should address an
obvious question, which is how such variation is possible in the first place.
In a perfectly competitive market, consumers would buy from the mostpolluting firms because they offer the lowest prices and the consumers are
not affected by the pollution; the other firms would go out of business. But
in a more realistic setting, variation is not surprising. If the price differences
are small, consumers might not be influenced by them, and prefer instead to
buy from trusted brands or convenient outlets. Some firms might enjoy
market power because of their location or other advantages. The firms might
vary because they have installed pollution-control technologies at different
times, have gambled with technologies that turned out to perform better than
or worse than average, or are managed differently. Variation in state tort law
and regulation may also account for differences in the firms’ pollutioncontrol technologies.
Let us first consider how a regulator would approach this industry if
it uses cost-benefit analysis. The regulator would ask whether the higherquality pollution control equipment generates benefits greater than the costs.
The benefits accrue to nearby residents who inhale the pollution, while the
costs are borne by consumers who buy the products. Notably, the regulator
would not pay attention to the variation among firms with respect to the
pollution control technology that they use and the amount of pollution they
emit. The cost-benefit analysis could reveal that even the least-polluting firm
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pollutes too much—the harms to residents exceed the benefits to consumers.
If so, the regulator would issue a regulation that burdens all the firms,
requiring all of them to install more technology and reduce emissions to a
level below the best-performing firm. Alternatively, the cost-benefit analysis
could also reveal that none of the firms should be regulated—even the worstperforming firm produces benefits greater than the costs. Any other level of
regulatory stringency is also possible.
By contrast, an agency that followed the norming approach would use
the distribution itself to set the level of strictness mandated by the regulation.
For example, this could involve requiring all firms to use the quality of
pollution-control technology (or emit pollution) at a level at least as good as
that of the median firm. Of course, one could imagine other approaches
roughly consistent with the idea of norming. The regulator might choose a
level of stringency that affects only the bottom X% of firms—where X could
be 5, 10, 75, or any other number.126 The idea of norming does not tell us how
much of the tail of the distribution is targeted; only that the regulator takes
the distribution as given and targets some portion of the tail.
Under what conditions could norming be superior to cost-benefit
analysis? The major challenge of cost-benefit analysis is estimating
valuations. The regulator must value both the benefits of a regulation (in our
example, health benefits, including saved medical costs) and the costs (in our
example, the cost of pollution-control technology). Both types of valuation
can be difficult. Many benefits of regulation are hard to monetize—including
avoided mortality risk, intangible health benefits like fewer headaches, and
enhancement of natural beauty. The cost of regulation also can be hard to
estimate because technology can change rapidly, causing compliance costs to
fall. When an agency engages in norming, it avoids having to estimate costs
and benefits, which also means it avoids the risk that calculation errors will
cause it to issue a regulation that is too strong or too weak.
Still, norming can be superior to cost-benefit analysis only if there is
reason to believe that the firm above the regulatory threshold is emitting the
optimal amount of pollution, or at least that it is closer to the optimum than a
regulator using cost-benefit analysis could get. But why would firms
voluntarily incur costs to reduce pollution below the profit-maximizing level?
There would need to be a source of constraint on pollution independent of
federal regulation. We can imagine such constraint arising from several
sources.
First, the variation could come from state law. Imagine that in most
(but not all) states, an optimal (or at least very good) tort or regulatory regime
prevails. If most firms are in the states with the optimal tort regime, then most
126
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firms will issue the optimal amount of pollution. The firms that issue an
excessive amount of pollution are located in the states with suboptimal tort
law. A federal regulation that required all firms to use the pollution control
technology of the median firm (or to emit no more pollution than the median
firm) would eliminate the inefficient outliers in the spirit of norming. Here,
the national regulator may lack the information needed to conduct costbenefit analysis but can piggyback off the independent efforts of state courts
and regulators around the country.127
Second, the variation could come from market structure. Imagine a
form of market segmentation in which most firms offer reasonable-quality
products to most consumers while a few firms offer low-quality products to
unsophisticated consumers. Such segmentation occurs in many industries.
For example, in credit markets banks tend to offer higher-quality products—
lower-risk loans that are adequately explained—than do some mortgage
brokers, payday lenders, and other bottom feeders, which offer complex and
risky products that lure unsophisticated borrowers. A regulator could believe
that by mandating the terms and product features of the best firms, it will
drive out of business the firms that pose unreasonable risks to consumers.
Third, the variation could come from management choices made
under different levels of information, and reflecting different risk preferences
among managers and investors. Imagine, for example, that entrepreneurs set
up exchanges or clearinghouses in order to act as intermediaries among
various sophisticated market agents. The entrepreneurs must choose various
features of their business, for example, the magnitude of margin
requirements. In making this choice, the entrepreneur must balance the costs
and benefits of its customers. Different entrepreneurs make different
judgments, resulting in variation across institutions. A regulator who thinks
that uniformity is desirable might reasonably believe that the median balance
is optimal, and accordingly mandate it by regulation.128
In many cases, we observe private associations choosing to mandate
standards among their members. When they do so, they typically observe a
variation of actions, and choose a standard somewhere in the middle. This is
familiar from ethical codes of conduct among lawyers, accounting standards,
medical standards, and so on. In these cases, the regulator may believe that
the association chooses a standard that protects the reputation of the industry,
127
An important case of this involves preemption, when federal regulators issue
regulations that preempt diverse state legal regimes.
128
The idea is formalized in the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which has been widely
discussed in the academic literature. See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2002); Dhammika Dharmapala &
Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law:
Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2003); Eric A. Posner & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006).

29

and endorse it through regulation because the association is in a better
position to assess benefits and costs than the regulator is. The regulator thus
converts the industry standard into a licensing requirement or other
independent source of law.
Generalizing from these examples, we conclude that norming may be
superior to cost-benefit analysis when (1) estimating costs and benefits is
extremely hard for the government; and (2) the industry in question either
does not create negative externalities (in the area in which the regulator
regulates) or is forced to internalize them by other sources of law,
considerations of reputation, and so on. When these conditions are met, the
argument for norming boils down to a claim that the large number of firms
that cluster around the median are more likely to have made a correct
judgment than the small number of outliers. The regulator thus uses the
pattern of behavior of the firms as a source of information that is more easily
obtainable than the information needed to estimate the costs and benefits of
particular technologies.
B.

The Problems with Norming

While the case for norming may be sound on theoretical grounds, we
are skeptical that the empirical conditions for norming prevail in many
markets. We are also concerned that norming may cause independent
problems, such as cartelization, and may be susceptible to political misuse.
We leave political misuse for Section C and address the other issues here.
Costs and benefits. The case for norming rests on the difficulty of
estimating costs and benefits. While in some quarters commentators remain
skeptical about cost-benefit analysis,129 this decision procedure has become
routine in government because of its many advantages. The quantification
problem arises for many reasons: some benefits (e.g., longevity, natural
beauty) are hard to measure; so are some costs, because of the speed with
which technology changes; and it is often difficult to trace out chains of
causation from regulation to business behavior. Yet these problems are
ubiquitous in ordinary life—for businesses as much as for regulators—and
quantification remains the standard procedure. When uncertainty exists, one
makes rough rather than precise estimates; and when uncertainty is high
enough, the normal solution is not to adopt some other procedure for
regulation but not to regulate in the first place. Regulators, like businesses,
can reduce uncertainty by investing in research.
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If businesses use cost-benefit analysis (normally, called net present
value analysis) to evaluate projects, then regulators can, too. Agencies can
also put in place institutional procedures that allow them to revisit costbenefit analyses that rely on uncertain estimates, and revise them as
necessary, in this way learning from experience.130
Externalities; market regulation. Our second basis for skepticism is
that most regulation is necessary because of the problem of externalities, and
norming is a particularly unwise approach to regulating externalities. Take
the paradigm case of pollution. Firms pollute in order to keep their costs
down. Because the harm is borne by third parties, the firms do not face any
penalty (except possibly a reputational penalty if the pollution is discovered)
in the absence of a legal response. If the legal or regulatory response is itself
based on the activity of the median firm, then the law will allow harmful
levels of pollution rather than stopping it. While the norming regulator may
shut down the worst polluters, it would do much better using cost-benefit
analysis if the median or above-median firms also emit excessively high
levels of pollution, as one would predict from normal market incentives.
In the previous section, we provided some scenarios in which state
law or reputational sanctions prevent the worse kind of abuse, and so norming
could be justified.131 But the scenarios do not seem likely to prevail in
practice. A major reason for federal regulation is that state regulation is
inadequate. Reputational sanctions are also typically weak. The best case for
norming arises when the industry does not generate externalities, but since
the major reason for regulation is to counter externalities, the best case will
not arise very often. Exchanges and clearinghouses, for example, are
regulated because of the negative external effects caused by financial crises,
which the collapse of an exchange or clearinghouse could spark. If these
institutions did not produce negative externalities, there would be little reason
to regulate them in the first place.
Cartelization. Many economists believe that firms have used
regulation to raise barriers to entry into their industry.132 A common
interpretation of licensing requirements, for example, is that they mandate
business practices that most firms in the industry already use, while forcing
out marginal firms or excluding new entrants who can offer the same goods
and services at lower prices if they are not required to engage in the median
or normal practice. If the business practice is unnecessary and undesired by
consumers, the effect of the regulation is to reduce competition, which
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benefits incumbent firms while harming consumers. Because the “norming”
approach does not involve direct evaluation of the benefits and costs of
existing business practices, the regulator may end up mandating business
practices that reduce competition. Indeed, as we argue in Section C, this may
explain why norming seems to be a regulatory approach that businesses
support.
Indeterminacy. As our case studies illustrated, norming is merely an
umbrella term that covers a vast range of regulatory stringency. The standard
does not itself tell the regulator whether to regulate at the 50th percentile, the
1st percentile, or the 99th percentile. One can narrow down the approach by
making certain assumptions. If, for example, the firms in the industry do not
generate externalities on others, there is a theoretical reason for using the 50th
percentile.133 But if the firms do generate externalities, a higher percentile
should be used. The case studies also show another problem: how does the
regulator identify the behavior that should be “normed”? For capital
regulation, regulators initially relied upon simple capital ratios that relied
only on the proportion of equity to assets. As it became clear that simple
capital ratios did not accurately measure the risk level of banking because
they ignore the riskiness of the underlying assets and liabilities, regulators
moved to a more complicated system.134 In the environmental examples, it
was never clear why the EPA chose one measure of pollution rather than
another. We suspect that agencies resolved both of these issues by relying
either on an informal cost-benefit test or succumbing to pressure from
industry or other interest groups.
C.

The Political Appeal of Norming

This brings us to the biggest concern with norming: that it is an
appealing way to regulate from a political rather than a social standpoint.
Agencies may choose to norm rather than conduct cost-benefit analysis or
another procedure because norming is easier, less vulnerable to judicial and
public scrutiny, and less likely to provoke political opposition from industry.
There are a number of reasons for this.
First, as we have observed, the major advantage of norming is that it
puts a low burden on the resources of agency decision-makers. Rather than
perform studies of the costs and benefits of various technologies, the
regulator need only survey industry practice. While the limited resources of
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regulators may justify the use of shortcuts from time to time, this particular
shortcut is extreme.
Second, norming may be appealing because it shields regulations
from judicial review. Because norming puts less of a burden on regulators
than cost-benefit analysis does, regulators that use norming are also less
likely to make identifiable errors that can be used against them when
regulations are challenged in court. In the case of cost-benefit analysis,
regulators can be (and have been) criticized for using inconsistent discount
factors and valuations; ignoring relevant academic studies; underestimating
costs and exaggerating benefits; and so on.135 Because there is an established
methodology for performing cost-benefit analysis, industry can retain
credible experts to identify these errors. While courts do not invariably strike
down regulations that are based on cost-benefit analyses that contain errors—
in fact, rarely do—the litigation risk is real, and a significant preoccupation
for agencies.136
By contrast, when an agency engages in norming, the only way for
the regulator to err is to mischaracterize the distribution of industry practices,
or to choose a threshold that is inconsistent with the statute or the arbitrary
and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. There is
nothing complicated about the first task. If, for example, the relevant variable
is the expense of the safety equipment that has been installed in factors, or
the amount of emissions, then the regulator will be able to rely on either
publicly available data or data collected from the industry, and it is simply a
matter of describing the distribution.
The choice of the regulatory threshold is more complicated. An
agency could, in principle, set the threshold exactly at the mean, near the
bottom of the tail, or nearly anywhere else on the distribution. The issue here
is that since there is no technical way to do so—no established formula or
procedure that provides a baseline against which errors could be identified—
it would be difficult for a challenger to explain to a court why the chosen
regulatory threshold is improper.137
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Third, because norming tends to result in low regulatory burdens for
most of the regulated industry, industry opposition is likely to be muted,
relative to more aggressive regulatory approaches like cost-benefit analysis.
In the area of financial regulation, for example, it is well known that banks
tend not to challenge regulations. While commentators have argued that
banks refrain from challenging regulations because they fear retaliation from
regulators,138 another reason might be that the banks believe that the
regulations actually serve their interest or are weak enough to be tolerated.
The automobile industry’s largely positive response to NHTSA’s side curtain
airbag regulation offers a similar example.139
In sum, while norming may be justified under narrow conditions,
agencies might use it more generally because it is easy to do and protects
them from opposition and scrutiny.
IV. NORMING ELSEWHERE IN THE LAW
A.

Constitutional Law

Many constitutional scholars believe that the Supreme Court engages
in a procedure akin to norming. In many cases, when people challenge a law
of a particular state, the Court surveys the relevant laws of all the states. If
few or no other states have enacted such a law, the court might find in this
pattern a “consensus” on certain constitutional values. The “outlier” state is
ruled out of constitutional bounds, and its law is struck down.
This procedure is best known from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Eighth Amendment bars criminal punishments that are “cruel and
unusual.”140 The Court has ruled that these terms are to be understood in light
of evolving norms, evidence of which is supplied by the practices of the states
and even of foreign countries. For example, in Coker v. Georgia, the Court
as Bellaire Bank, maintain a higher level of equity than Bellaire Bank. This analysis
may indicate that further investigation is needed. It does not, by itself, prove that
the Bank's capital level was unsafe and unsound. It is very possible that all the banks
in the peer group are maintaining a safe and sound capital level. Without a
connection between the peer group analysis and a finding of unsafe and unsound
capital levels, therefore, the peer group analysis does not support the Comptroller’s
finding that the Bank's capital level was unsafe and unsound.
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struck down a law that imposed the death penalty on those convicted of raping
an adult woman. After pointing that “at no time in the last 50 years have a
majority of the States authorized death as a punishment for rape,” and
pointing to other indications that most states disapprove of this practice, the
Court ruled that the punishment is cruel and unusual, and hence
unconstitutional.141 Following the same style of reasoning, the Court has
struck downs laws that impose the death penalty on children and mentally
retarded people who commit capital crimes.142
Some scholars have argued that, in Judge Easterbrook’s words, the
Court “extirpates outliers” in many other areas of its jurisprudence, including
equal protection and substantive due process.143 Consider the contraception
ban struck down in Griswold144 or the sodomy law struck down in Lawrence
v. Texas.145 In both of these cases, the Court ruled against a single state or
small number of states whose laws deviated in significant measure from the
laws of other states.146 It is possible to see this type of logic in the Court’s
procedural due process and Second Amendment147 cases as well. The Court’s
occasional reference to the laws of other countries fits this pattern as well.
When deciding Eighth Amendment or due process cases, the Court
sometimes surveys the laws of other countries—particularly developed
democracies—to ascertain whether American law is an outlier. This is
norming of a more stringent type, where the U.S. is normed to a high standard
set by just a few countries.
This practice can be compared with other constitutional methods.
Originalist scholars, for example, argue that a court should strike down
statutes that violate the original understanding of the Constitution.148 It is
irrelevant whether any, many, or most states have similar statutes. If certain
gun control laws violate the Second Amendment, it is irrelevant whether most
states have those gun control laws: they must all be struck down. Another
standard view, according to which courts should protect minorities shut out
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of the political process,149 also rejects the relevance of frequency of such
statutes. If most or even all states have laws that discriminate against racial
or sexual minorities, for example, those laws are still unconstitutional. It
would make no sense for a court committed to protecting minorities to uphold
those laws, or limit itself to striking down the most discriminatory statutes in
the very worst states while upholding less discriminatory statutes in the
remaining states.
The Court’s norming practice has been the topic of considerable
debate, with a great deal of attention paid to whether the Court has applied
the outlier-extirpation approach in a consistent and reasonable matter. On the
merits of the procedure, most scholars seem skeptical. They argue that a
consensus among the states does not necessarily reflect much about the views
and constitutional values of the people, or even of the state legislatures. A
few scholars have suggested that the Court’s approach could make sense. As
Cass Sunstein puts it, “consensus may have epistemic value: if most people
believe that X is true, X may well be true, certainly under favorable
conditions.”150 If most states believe that executing mentally disabled people
is cruel, then it may well be cruel.
As Sunstein’s comment suggests, the case for outlier-extirpation is
informational, just as the case for norming is. The difference between the
administrative and constitutional settings is that the regulators are mainly
concerned with facts about the world—whether a type of pollution causes
harms, for example—while in constitutional cases the focus is on moral or
constitutional values.151 If such things as constitutional values exist, and if
they are reflected in state legislation, then the Supreme Court may discover
those values by observing the practices of states rather than relying on the
possibly defective intuitions of the justices. The logic of information
aggregation applies in both cases.
The Court’s jurisprudence shows the benefits and limits of norming.
On the one hand, the Court’s use of norming seems understandable because
in many cases it has no external standard for evaluating the laws of the states.
To the extent that these laws reflect information—about facts or values—they
can reasonably be used as a source to derive a national standard if such a
standard is called for. On the other hand, the Court’s approach is vulnerable
to the objections that we have seen. If state legislatures do not independently
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reflect on the advisability of these laws before enacting them, or if states are
not trying to arrive at socially optimal answers, the normative force of the
pattern is questionable.
A major difference between agency practice and judicial practice is
that the agencies are far more concerned with behavior that generates
externalities. Where, as we have discussed, a business practice causes harms
to third parties, the regulator should try to stop that practice or at least restrain
it. While the firm at the center of the distribution causes less harm that the
outlier, both firms should be regulated. In contrast, most of the Supreme
Court cases we have discussed do not involve externalities in such a
straightforward way. If Connecticut bans contraception, it does not harm
people in Oklahoma or California. There are other areas of the law that
restrict states from imposing externalities on each other—for example, the
domestic commerce clause, which blocks states from imposing trade barriers
on each other. Because the states externalize costs through trade barriers, the
outlier-extirpation approach would be unwise and does not appear to be used
by the Court, as one would expect.
B.

Incorporation of Custom in the Common Law

Another style of norming occurs in pockets of the common law where
courts derive legal standards from the customary practices of firms. In tort
law, for example, courts frequently use custom to determine the level of due
care for the purpose of establishing whether a defendant acted negligently.
Custom may supply evidence of due care, or even the standard itself.152 This
is common in the area of medical malpractice, among many others, where
doctors are held to the community standard rather than required to comply
with an independent cost-benefit analysis. In contract law, courts sometimes
use industry custom to fill in gaps or resolve ambiguities in contracts.153
Incorporation of custom also sometimes occurs in statutory interpretation,
especially when statutes are vague and subject to judicial elaboration over
time. In intellectual property law, industry standards are used to determine
the meaning of fair use and the point at which an invention becomes obvious,
among other concepts.154 Examples in common and statutory law can be
easily multiplied.
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Incorporation of custom can be contrasted to other methods for
resolving common-law disputes. In tort law, a defendant’s behavior can be
subject to a cost-benefit test, like the Hand formula. In The T.J. Hooper,
Judge Hand himself rejected custom as a defense because he believed that
industry customs will be insufficient to protect third parties.155 In contract
law, judges may prefer to rely on more traditional methods of contractual
interpretation, such as scrutinizing the evidentiary record for the intentions of
the parties, which may deviate from custom. These approaches can lead to
different levels of liability. In tort law, if an industry adopts a common
practice that externalizes harm on third parties, then a court that defers to
custom will hold liable only the worst offenders, while a court that uses a
cost-benefit test may end up holding liable everyone or nearly everyone in
the industry.
In theory, custom can be efficient, or otherwise desirable, but even its
major defenders agree that the conditions under which it is efficient are
limited.156 When an industry consists of similarly situated agents who enter
into repeated interactions with each other—trading goods and services, for
example—it is easy to see why, as a matter of theory, the customs they adopt
might be welfare-maximizing for the group. But custom is less likely to be
welfare-maximizing if the agents have different levels of wealth, market
power, and sophistication, and especially when their customary behavior
externalizes costs on third parties.157 An industry “custom” of discharging
toxic waste in public waterways is hardly likely to be desirable from the social
perspective.
Incorporation of custom into the common law offers an analogy to
norming in agency regulation. In both cases, the legal decision-maker uses
community standards—the “norms” of business behavior—to determine
legal standards, and in doing so targets outliers while sparing the normal or
above-normal firm from liability. Given that regulatory agencies have
inherited many of the duties of the common law courts, it may be unsurprising
that regulatory agencies have adopted a practice that has been common
among those courts. But this is not to say that the practice is wise.
CONCLUSION
Many regulators engage in norming—setting regulatory standards on
the basis of what existing firms are already doing. In some cases, norming is
explicitly written into the statutes that authorize regulatory action; in other
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cases, agencies have adopted norming as a matter of their own discretion. In
either case, the result is that agency regulation is often tethered closely to
existing industry practice.
It is possible to mount a defense of norming as appropriate agency
practice. If firms within an industry are already self-regulating in some
manner, that is a strong indication that the regulation will provide at least
some health and safety benefits without unduly harming the industry. An
agency process of norming and re-norming over time could act as a ratchet,
increasing the level of regulatory stringency in a manner that consistently
passes a cost-benefit test. If agencies are trying to ensure that they first do no
harm, there is a lot to be said for norming.
But norming is inferior to cost-benefit analysis. Norming unduly
privileges the status quo; CBA does not. There is an irony in the fact that
critics of CBA have long derided it as a tool used to block beneficial
regulation.158 In fact, agencies themselves have hamstrung regulation by
engaging in norming rather than following whatever regulatory course CBA
would dictate. Perhaps this is the result of political necessity—perhaps
agencies would struggle to promulgate regulations if they faced concerted
opposition from every major firm each time they attempted to act. If so, those
who favor stricter regulation should pressure agencies to rely on cost-benefit
analysis.
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